THE SHELLFISH NETWORK’S SUBMISSION TO THE CONSULTATION ON THE DRAFT ANIMAL WELFARE (SENTENCING AND RECOGNITION OF SENTIENCE) BILL
The Shellfish Network is the oldest organisation in the UK campaigning for the welfare of crustaceans and other shellfish
Email: [email protected]
Website: http://shellfishnetwork.weebly.com/
SUMMARY
1) We agree with the definition given of sentience- ‘the ability to perceive or feel things'. It would be a mistake to give a special meaning to the term, as this would cause confusion and lead to lower animal welfare standards.
2) We agree with the definition of ‘animal’ - 'an organism endowed with life, sensation and voluntary motion'. This definition should be reinforced with the addition of the phrase ‘vertebrate and invertebrate’ or ‘this includes vertebrates and invertebrates’, depending on the context. There have been many problems caused by the unscientific definition of ‘animal’ used in the Animal Welfare Act 2006. There is a detailed discussion below on this subject. In this, from an epistemological perspective, both deductive and inductive approaches are taken into account.
3) We agree with the outline of the welfare needs of animals. To these could be added the need to facilitate positive experiences.
4) We agree that the scope of the bill should apply to all policy areas.
5) The bill should use the phrase ‘should have full regard’.
6) We are happy with the increase of sentence.
7) As far as animals under our direct control are concerned, we do not believe that, in general, the ‘public interest’ conflicts with the welfare of animals but rather the reverse.
8) The Animal Welfare Act should be amended so that the government has the duty rather than the power to extend the protections of the Act to new groups of animals if there is strong evidence that they are capable of experiencing pain.
INTRODUCTION
The definition of ‘animal’ suggested in the Draft Bill - 'an organism endowed with life, sensation and voluntary motion’ is in accord with both common sense and scientific understanding. Therefore we would welcome it. However, as the definition of ‘animal’ has become linked to legal protection and as, bizarrely, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 defines the term ‘animal’ as being restricted so as only to apply to vertebrate animals and not to include invertebrates (See 1(1)), we will examine this issue here in more detail. In the light of this discussion, at the end of the paper, we will briefly examine the definition of sentience and the importance of preserving its scientific and common sense meaning. In addition, reference will be made to ‘the public interest’.
DEFINITION OF ANIMAL AND THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER INVERTEBRATES ARE CAPABLE OF EXPERIENCING PAIN
The understanding of animal pain has progressed immeasurably since the time of Descartes who famously claimed that animals were not able to experience pain. We now have a far better understanding of the nature of pain and how it impacts on animals and humans alike.
Of course, legislation in this area does not always follow scientific knowledge. Very often it is, instead, influenced by perceived commercial interests or just plain inertia. Nevertheless, we will outline some of the reasons why invertebrates (at present not usually protected by the law) have been shown to be capable of experiencing pain and why they should be defined as animals in the legal sense.
THE EXPERIENCE OF PAIN
According to Sneddon, many scientists suggest that pain :
the negative experience that accompanies tissue damage is crucial in altering an animal's subsequent behaviour to perform protective and guarding reactions, enabling the animal to avoid such stimuli in future, and for avoidance learning to occur (Sneddon et al., 2014). This implies that the unpleasant internal state of experiencing pain goes hand in hand with its perception as it has to be such a strong aversive stimulus to ensure animals will alter future behaviour and learn from the event. If this were not the case, animals would continue to damage themselves repeatedly, resulting in disease, loss of limbs and even mortality.1
The consequences of not being able to experience pain can be seen in the rare human condition of congenital analgesia. In this disorder, a person is unable to experience pain. This means that there is not the same incentive to avoid danger. This in turn often leads to death or serious injury in childhood. It is safe to say that animals, which usually do not have the same cognitive abilities as humans, would be even more likely to suffer injury or death if they were not able to experience pain. Therefore, it would seem a priori that all animals with a normal nervous system are highly likely to be able to experience pain.
This, of course, accords with the common sense view of the vast majority of the population. Anyone who has observed animal behaviour knows that animals, like humans, will try to avoid painful stimuli. This behaviour is seen not only in vertebrates but also in invertebrates. In fact, the recognition of this is not restricted to adult humans. Young children know intuitively that this is the case. For example, children who are unfortunate enough to be traumatised by seeing a crab struggling to get out of a pan of boiling water know that it is trying to escape pain.2
NOCICEPTION WITHOUT PAIN?
Despite what would appear to be obvious, some have suggested that some animals may react exclusively to stimuli without experiencing pain. There is no doubt that reflex actions are widely prevalent in the animal kingdom. However, the idea that all animal behaviour is governed by reflex is another matter. To test this hypothesis, a number of experiments have been done to investigate this in invertebrates. Professor Robert Elwood of Queens University, a world expert in this field, has carried out a large number of studies into whether or not crustaceans experience pain. In one experiment he tested whether shore crabs were able to remember pain. The crabs were electrically shocked when they went into one shelter but not shocked when they went into the other. Over a number of trials, the crabs quickly learnt not to enter the shelter in which they had been shocked. This showed that not only did they feel pain but also that they could remember the experience of pain between trials. Elwood also found that hermit crabs were more likely to exit from poor quality shells in which they had been shocked than from good quality shells. This showed that there were motivational trade-offs involved rather than reflex reactions on the part of the crabs. In a third experiment, Elwood showed that glass prawns groomed antennae that had been treated by a noxious chemical more than ones that had not been so treated. Moreover, when an anaesthetic was applied to the treated antennae the grooming was reduced.3
These experiments show beyond reasonable doubt that these animals experienced pain, and that their behaviour could not reasonably be explained as merely reflex action. Other studies by Elwood and others show the same kind of results. 4
There is also substantial evidence that molluscs such as aplysia and octopi experience pain. For example, the following experiment, carried out by E.T Walters, is mentioned by Sneddon:
In Aplysia, experiments have shown that these animals can learn to associate a neutral stimulus, the smell of shrimp, with electric shock. Indeed, when the smell was presented alone, Aplysia froze in what could be considered a motivated fear response, and when innocuous light touches were applied, these animals responded in an overt manner with escape movements, ink directed at the location of the stimulus and withdrawal (Walters et al., 1981). Therefore, previous experience with a noxious event was remembered and the animal's motivational responses were altered.5
This shows that even the aplysia species, a simple form of mollusc, is able to not only experience pain but also to remember it. In addition, there have been some well-known experiments performed on more complex molluscs such as octopi (classed as cephalopods) to show that they experience pain. However, because of their unpleasant nature, we have decided not to include them here.
This evidence reinforces the view of the Animal and Welfare Scientific Panel (AHAW) of EFSA the European Food Safety Authority, which concluded:
‘that all Cephalopoda and decapod crustaceans fall into the same category of animals as those that are at present protected.’6
In other words, they should be protected in the same way as other protected species such as mammals.
So it is clear that, from an epistemological point of view, the more inductive approach of science supports the conclusions of the more deductive approach mentioned earlier. Invertebrates can experience pain and can remember it, just as do vertebrates.
Of course, there has been more research carried out on some invertebrates than on others. However, it would be a mistake to assume that those animals least researched are necessarily least sentient or least capable of experiencing pain. On the other hand, it may be that very simple organisms experience less pain than those with complex nervous systems. For example a hydra might be expected, all else being equal, to experience less pain than an animal with a complex nervous system such as a decapod crustacean. However, this hierarchy of pain hypothesis has yet to be researched in any depth and the methodological difficulties involved are considerable.7
APPALLING CRUELTY
As a consequence of the lack of legal protection for crustaceans and other invertebrates, appalling cruelty has taken place. This will be looked at in horror by future generations. Lobsters, crabs and other crustaceans have been boiled alive, have been cut up alive, and have had their limbs torn off in huge numbers. In this country, millions of animals each year are slaughtered with no regulations governing how this is to be done humanely. This is a stain upon our culture and makes this perhaps the most important animal welfare issue of the present time.
THIS CRUELTY IS UNNECESSARY
If consumers wish to continue to eat crustaceans and other shellfish, there are more humane methods of slaughter. Electrical stunning is likely to be the most humane method. 8 Machines such as the Crustastun, as well as stansas, are increasingly being used by Waitrose and other retailers.
BRITISH LEGISLATIVE FAILURE AND LEGISLATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES
The Animal Welfare Act 2006 only protects vertebrates. However, it states that:
(3) The appropriate national authority may by regulations for all or any of the purposes of this Act—(a) extend the definition of “animal” so as to include invertebrates of any description;
(4) The power under subsection (3)(a) or (c) may only be exercised if the appropriate national authority is satisfied, on the basis of scientific evidence, that animals of the kind concerned are capable of experiencing pain or suffering.
One might have thought that by now, given the overwhelming evidence that at least decapod crustaceans and cephalopods experience pain, the protections of the Act would have been extended to these animals. However, the government has asked for ‘unequivocal proof’ that these animals experience pain. This is, of course, an impossibility. As far as the experience of pain is concerned, it is not possible to have this level of certainty about any animal. 9 Moreover, this standard was not required for other animals protected by the Act. To avoid this kind of misinterpretation, perhaps an addendum could be added to clause 4 stating:
‘Measuring the capacity for pain in any animal is a difficult task but:
(i) The criteria for deciding whether an animal is capable of experiencing pain should not be more stringent than those used for assessing animals already protected by the Act.
(ii) Allowance should be made for differences in physiology and pain experiencing mechanisms in deciding whether an animal is capable of experiencing pain.
(iii) The standard for deciding whether an animal is capable of experiencing pain is that of strong probability. ‘
These criteria should be obvious but they have not been adhered to so far.
iv) In addition, the power to add the protections of the Act to new groups of animals should instead become a duty to do so, if the above criteria are met.
A further example of how muddled British law is, as far as animal welfare is concerned, can be seen in the conflict between the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and the Animals [Scientific Procedures] Act 1986. In the latter a revision of legislation in 2013 made cephalopods protected animals, while in the former Act no such protection is given. To say that ‘the law is an ass’ could be seen as a slur on asses!
More and more countries are passing legislation to protect crustaceans, as well as cephalopods. New Zealand10 , Norway, and Switzerland all have legislation of this kind. Those concerned about commercial interests should note that these countries do not appear to have found any problems in this regard.
IS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN ANIMAL WELFARE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST?
The simple answer is generally no, at least as far as animals which are directly under human control are concerned. For example, when animals suffer pain during slaughter, stress hormones are released. This severely affects the quality of the flesh. 11 This, in turn, may have a substantial effect on the health of those who eat the flesh. This applies to invertebrates as much as to vertebrates. It is, therefore, in consumers’ interests to slaughter these animals humanely or, preferably, not at all. EFSA, the European Food safety Authority, reinforces this idea:
The safety of the food chain is indirectly affected by the welfare of animals, particularly those farmed for food production, due to the close links between animal welfare, animal health and food-borne diseases. Stress factors and poor welfare can lead to increased susceptibility to disease among animals. 12
A BRIEF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE TERM SENTIENCE
In this paper, we have largely focussed on the issue of pain in invertebrates, especially in decapod crustaceans and molluscs. This is because, in the past, this has been a contentious area and the legal unscientific definition of ‘animal’ has been linked to this controversy. In our view it would be a great mistake to repeat this error and to give the term ‘sentience’ a ‘special’ meaning. This would lead to the same kind of unnecessary controversy. To add other criteria to the definition of sentience would lead to negative consequences. It would make it more difficult to prove that an animal was ‘sentient’ despite the fact that it was obvious that it was capable of experiencing pain.
CONCLUSION
We welcome the proposed definitions of ‘animal’ and ‘sentience’ in this draft bill, both of which are supported by scientific understanding and common sense. The definition of ‘animal’ should be strengthened by adding the phrase ‘vertebrates and invertebrates’ or ‘this includes vertebrates and invertebrates’ to make the definition absolutely clear. It would be helpful to add these phrases in the light of problems arising from the unscientific definition of animal in the Animal Welfare Act 2006. We believe that this, plus an amendment of the Animal Welfare Act, will lead to the long overdue protection of decapod crustaceans, cephalopods and other invertebrates. We hope that in future there will be more emphasis on common sense definitions, up to date science and logical thinking in determining animal welfare issues. The cruelty meted out to many invertebrates, especially toward crustaceans, has been a stain upon our culture. Let us now move forwards and try to restore our reputation as a nation which takes animal welfare seriously. This will not only be good for animals, it will also help us as humans to live healthier and happier lives.
APPENDIX
LEGISLATION IN NEW ZEALAND
An extract from the New Zealand Animal Welfare Act 1999
(2) Interpretation
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,--
animal--
(a) means any live member of the animal kingdom that is--
(i) a mammal; or
(ii) a bird; or
(iii) a reptile; or
(iv) an amphibian; or
(v) a fish (bony or cartilaginous); or
(vi) any octopus, squid, crab, lobster, or crayfish (including freshwater crayfish); or
(vii) any other member of the animal kingdom which is declared from time to time by the Governor-General, by Order in Council, to be an animal for the purposes of this Act
REFERENCES
1) Sneddon, L.U. (2015). ‘Pain in aquatic animals’ Journal of Experimental Biology. 218 (7): 967–976. doi:10.1242/jeb.088823).
2) Correspondence from Shellfish Network members.
3) See http://shellfishnetwork.weebly.com/more-scientific-evidence.html accessed 29.1.18
4) See Magee, B & Elwood, R 2016, 'Trade-offs between predator avoidance and electric shock avoidance in hermit crabs demonstrate a non-reflexive response to noxious stimuli consistent with prediction of pain' Behavioural Processes, vol 130, pp. 31-35. DOI: 10.1016/j.beproc.2016.06.017
Elwood, Robert W.; Adams, Laura. ‘Electric shock causes physiological stress responses in shore crabs, consistent with prediction of pain’. In: Biology Letters, Vol. 11, No. 11, 20150800, 11.2015.
Magee, Barry; Elwood, Robert W ‘Shock avoidance by discrimination learning in the shore crab (Carcinus maenas) is consistent with a key criterion for pain.’ .In: Journal of Experimental Biology, Vol. 216, No. 3, 01.02.2013, p. 353-358.
Elwood, R.W ‘Evidence for pain in decapod crustaceans’. In: Animal Welfare, Vol. 21, No. SUPPL. 2, 01.06.2012, p. 23-27.
Elwood, R.W ,’Pain and suffering in invertebrates?’ .In: ILAR JOURNAL, Vol. 52, No. 2, 01.01.2011, p. 175-184
5) Sneddon, 2015, ‘Pain in aquatic animals’, Journal of Experimental Biology
6) The EFSA Journal (2005) 292, 1-46 - Opinion on the “Aspects of the biology and welfare of animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes” See : http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/lab_animals/pdf/efsa_opinion.pdf.
Accessed 27.1.18
7) Idea discussed with Professor Elwood via email
8) Roth B, et al, ‘Stunning and Killing of Edible crabs’, Animal Welfare , vol 19, 3. Aug 2010, pp287-294, Universities Federation for Animal Welfare
9) Elwood R.W, Adams Laura ‘ Electric shock causes physiological stress responses in shore crabs, consistent with prediction of pain’, Published 11 November 2015.DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2015.0800 School of Biological Sciences, Queen's University, Belfast
10) See appendix.
11) Guidelines for Humane Handling, Transport and Slaughter of Livestock, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.
12) See https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/animalwelfare accessed 27.1.18